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Abstract 
 
We examined the use of hand gestures while people solved spatial reasoning problems in which 
they had to infer how components of a mechanical device will move from a static diagram of the 
device (mental animation problems). In Experiment 1, participants were asked to think aloud 
while solving mental animation problems. They gestured on more than 90% of problems, and 
most gestures expressed information about the component motions that was not stated in words. 
Two further experiments examined whether the gestures functioned in the mechanical inference 
process, or whether they merely served functions of expressing or communicating the results of 
this process. In these experiments, we examined the effects of instructions to think aloud, 
restricting participants’ hand motions, and secondary tasks on mental animation performance. 
Although participants who were instructed to think aloud gestured more than control groups, 
some gestures occurred even in control conditions. A concurrent spatial tapping task impaired 
performance on mechanical reasoning, whereas a simple tapping task and restricting hand 
motions did not. These results indicate that gestures are a natural way of expressing the results of 
mental animation processes and suggest that spatial working memory and premotor 
representations are involved in mental animation. They provide no direct evidence that gestures 
are functional in the thought process itself, but do not rule out a role for overt gestures in this 
type of spatial thinking.  
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Use of Gestures in Mental Animation 
 
When people are asked to think aloud while solving problems, they often make hand 
movements, or gestures, and these gestures often communicate information about their thought 
processes that is not communicated in speech (e.g., Alibali, Bassok, Solomon, Syc, & Goldin-
Meadow, 1999; Garber & Goldin-Meadow, 2002; Schwartz & Black, 1996a; Emmorey & Casey, 
2001). Gestures are particularly evident in problem solving with spatial content, such as puzzles 
in which people have to place blocks such that they fill a puzzle grid (Emmorey & Casey, 2001), 
and mechanical reasoning problems in which people have to predict the motion of mechanical 
components (Schwartz & Black, 1996a). In these cases, people’s gestures often simulate the 
object motions that they have to imagine in solving the problem.  
What are the functions of gestures in problem solving situations? Much of the research on 
gestures and problem solving has focused on the ways in which gestures reflect people’s mental 
representations and problem solving processes. This research suggests that gestures may be a 
natural way of expressing or communicating the results of internal thought processes and may 
reveal alternative solution processes that participants do not describe verbally. Research in 
semiotics has shown that gestures can also be used to overtly express or reinforce information 
presented in the speech stream. In this sense, gestures can also function to highlight or 
communicate information about problem solving process. An additional possibility is that 
gestures may not only reflect thought but be functional in the thought processes themselves. That 
is, gestures might aid mental computations, and not merely reflect the results of these 
computations.  
In this article we examine the roles of gestures in a type of spatial inference problem in 
which people have to infer motion from static diagrams. We refer to these as mental animation 
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problems (Hegarty, 1992). Following Alibali (2005), we define a gesture as any movement of the 
hand or body that accompanies problem solving, regardless of whether the gesture is 
accompanied by speech. We examine how people naturally use gestures when solving spatial 
inference problems, and how preventing people from gesturing affects performance.  
Gestures as reflections of thought. There is mounting evidence that gestures reflect 
people’s internal representations while they reason and solve problems. One source of evidence 
comes from studies of gesture-speech mismatch (Goldin-Meadow, Alibali & Church, 1993; 
Garber & Goldin-Meadow; 2002; Alibali et al., 1999). In these studies, investigators examine 
mismatches between the representation of a problem or its solution that are expressed in speech, 
and the representations and solution processes revealed by gesture. For example in development 
of the concept of conservation, children sometimes describe one level of understanding in speech 
while communicating a more advanced level in gesture and those who show such gesture-speech 
mismatches are more responsive to instruction about conservation (Goldin-Meadow et al., 1993). 
Gesture-speech mismatches also predict adults’ solution processes, for example in mathematics 
problem solving (Alibali et al., 1999) and in solving the Tower of Hanoi problem (Garber & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2002). One interpretation of these results is that gestures reveal secondary 
concepts or solution processes that are never expressed in the speech stream. 
In other problem solving situations, gestures have been found to match the content found 
in co-occuring language, such that gestures can provide extra information not specified in the 
language alone. For example, when explaining to an addressee how to solve a puzzle in which 
blocks of different shapes had to arranged so that they fit a puzzle grid, Emmorey & Casey 
(2001) found that people often produced deictic anaphoric constructions (e.g., “turn it this way”) 
in which the manner of turning the block was communicated in gesture only, and the speech 
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referred to the gesture. This use of gesture appeared to be intentional in that it occurred only 
when the addressee was visible (in other conditions of the experiment, in which the addressee 
was not visible, people still gestured, but did not use as many deictic anaphoric constructions). 
Schwartz & Black (1996a) observed similar constructions in which speech referred to gesture 
(which they called exophoric references) when people “thought aloud” while solving mental 
animation problems. One interpretation of these results is that details of motion are often not 
easily communicated in language, and that gesture is a more natural means of communication in 
this case, because the hands can be used to mimic the details of the motion to be communicated 
(Emmorey & Casey, 2001). 
Functions of gestures in thought. In the examples presented above, people were asked to 
think aloud or describe to an addressee how they solved problems, so they were required to 
express their thoughts verbally. In these situations, gestures can be interpreted as reflecting 
thought, in the sense that the thought or internal representation comes first, and the gestures 
express or communicate the thought process. In addition to this function of gesture, an additional 
possibility is that gestures are functional in the thought processes themselves. This view is 
supported by preliminary evidence that gestures often precede speech (Emmorey & Casey, 
2001), that speakers use gestures in communicating the solution of a problem, even when the 
addressee is not visible (Emmorey & Casey, 2001) and even when they are not asked to think 
aloud (Schwartz & Black, 1996a). Note that this is not an alternative view to the idea that 
gestures communicate thought processes, but rather it suggests an additional role for gesture, 
reflecting McNeill’s (1992) view that gesture is both an act of communication and an act of 
thought.  
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There are at least two ways in which gestures might be functional in solving spatial 
problems such as puzzles and mental animation problems. First, one’s hand can be used to 
represent an object that must be mentally transformed, such that moving the hand reveals 
something about the motion or its result. For example, in solving a puzzle that involved 
imagining moving an L-shaped block, participants made an L shape with their hands and moved 
their hands to consider possible positions of the block (Emmorey & Casey, 2001). Similarly in a 
problem that involved imagining how interlocking gears would move, Schwartz & Black (1996a) 
found that some participants used their hands to represent the gears, interlocked their fingers, and 
observed that when one hand moved clockwise the other had to move counterclockwise. In these 
cases, hands, which were free to move, represented objects that could not be physically moved 
while solving the problem.  
Another way in which gestures might be functional in thought is in representing the 
results of intermediate computations. For example, in mentally animating mechanical systems, 
Hegarty (1992) found that participants infer the motion of components one by one, in order of 
the causal chain of events in the system’s operation. This strategy involves maintaining 
information about the motions of earlier components in the causal chain, which is necessary to 
infer the motion of later components. However, internal maintenance of this information may 
compete with processing demands, as proposed by theories of working memory (Baddeley, 
1986; Logie, 1995). In this situation, information maintenance might be offloaded on the motor 
system. For example, if a person has inferred that one gear in a gear system turns clockwise, she 
could make a clockwise motion with her hand to maintain this information, thus freeing up 
working memory resources for computing how the next component moves.  
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In somewhat related research, there is mounting evidence that imagining spatial 
transformations may be dependent on the motor system, in the sense that mental transformations 
involve high-level mental representations and brain mechanisms that are also used in action 
planning (Kosslyn, 1994; Logie 1995). Brain imaging studies have shown that areas of premotor 
cortex are active when people imagine spatial transformations of objects (Wraga, Shepherd, 
Church, Inati & Kosslyn, in press). However, evidence that spatial transformation processes 
involve premotor activation does not necessarily imply that they will be accompanied by overt 
gestures.  
Other research has found that spatial transformations such as mental rotation are 
facilitated by hand motions that are congruent with the motions to be imagined, and impaired by 
incongruent hand motions (Wexler, Kosslyn & Berthoz, 1998; Wohlschlager & Wolschlager, 
1998). This result generalizes to motions that would produce the imagined motion, when using a 
tool, even if the hand motion is not congruent with the object motion to be imagined (Schwartz 
& Holton, 2000). If congruent hand motions facilitate spatial thinking, it is plausible that people 
might spontaneously make congruent hand motions during spatial thinking. However, using hand 
motions strategically in this way may also depend on metacognitive knowledge of their effects 
on spatial thinking, so these results do not necessarily imply that people will spontaneously 
gesture while solving spatial problems.  
The Present Study. In the present study, we examined hand motions that people made 
while solving mental animation problems about mechanical systems. In these problems, people 
are shown a static diagram of a mechanical system, given information about how one component 
of the system is moving, and must infer how another component moves (see the example in 
Figure 1). These problems are highly spatial in that they involve analyzing the spatial 
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arrangement of components of a mechanical system and inferring motion, which is a spatial 
property. Reaction time and eye-fixation data suggest that people solve mental animation 
problems piecemeal, inferring the motion of components one at a time in order of the causal 
chain of events (Hegarty, 1992). Several sources of evidence suggest that for novel mental 
animation problems, the inference process is often one of mentally simulating the motions of 
components (Hegarty, 2004). For example, mental animation performance is highly correlated 
with spatial ability (Hegarty & Sims, 1994) and mental animation interferes more with a spatial 
working memory load than a verbal working memory load (Sims & Hegarty, 1997). Furthermore 
when imagining the motion of two interlocking gears, time to infer whether a knob on one gear 
will fit into a groove on the other is related to the angle of rotation, suggesting an analog imagery 
process (Schwartz & Black, 1996b).  
 Schwartz & Black (1996a) first documented the use of hand gestures in solving mental 
animation problems. They asked people to imagine gear chains of different lengths (e.g., 5, 6 or 
7 gears) on the basis of a verbal description. Participants, who worked either alone or in dyads 
told which direction the gear on one end was moving, and were asked to infer how the gear on 
the other end of the chain would move. They solved several problems of this type. When they 
began solving these problems, participants frequently gestured, using their hands to simulate the 
gears. As they solved more problems, their gestures became less frequent and they induced a rule 
that interlocking gears move in opposite directions so that that every other gear in the chain will 
turn in the same direction. Schwartz & Black, interpreted their gestures as indicating a mental 
simulation process, which was replaced by a rule-based reasoning process. While early, 
simulation-based reasoning was accompanied by gestures, they acknowledged that they could 
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not offer any proof on the basis of their data that hand gestures were functional in the inference 
process.  
 In the present study, the participants solved several different types of mental animation 
problems, including gear, pulley, lever problems and problems showing mechanical systems that 
were made up of several different types of components. We used problems about a variety of 
different mechanical systems, to minimize the development of rules of mechanical reasoning, as 
documented by Schwartz & Black (1996a), which occurs if people solve the same type of 
problem (e.g. gear problems) over and over. However, we cannot be sure that some participants 
did not either possess rules of mechanical reasoning or develop them in the course of the 
experiment. 
In a pilot study, 12 participants were asked to think aloud and were videotaped while they 
solved 22 mechanical reasoning problems of the type shown in Figure 1. Participants were 
shown the problems, which were printed on paper, one at a time. In previous studies with similar 
problems, participants had difficulty finding names to distinguish the different mechanical 
components (the upper pulley on the right, etc.) and this naming process clearly introduced 
additional cognitive processes that were not part of the mental animation process itself. 
Therefore, participants were given a pencil and were instructed that they could use this to point 
to the mechanical component in the diagram that they were referring to as they described their 
thinking. That is, they were instructed to use the pointer for deictic purposes. We discovered that 
rather than just pointing, participants frequently moved the pencil while reporting their thought 
processes, and we coded these movements as gestures. On average, participants gestured during 
their explanations of 20.1 (91%) of the problems. The most common type of gesture was to trace 
the motion of a component on the diagram with the pencil, e.g., if the participant inferred that a 
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gear was turning clockwise, he or she would trace the outside of the gear in a clockwise motion. 
Thus, participants produced what can be called “imitative” gestures (i.e., gestures that imitate a 
path or direction of motion), and not just deictic gestures.  
We examined the expressive and communicative functions of gestures more closely in 
Experiment 1. In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined how both gesturing and mental animation 
performance are influenced by several manipulations, including instructions to think aloud, 
incongruent hand motions, and preventing gestures. We considered three possibilities regarding 
the function of gestures in mental animation. The first possibility is that gestures are functional in 
verbally expressing or communicating the results of mental animation processes only, and motor 
processes have no role in the mental animation process itself. If this is true, people should only 
gesture when asked to think aloud and incongruent hand motions or preventing gestures should 
not affect performance. The second possibility is that gesture is functional in both verbal 
expression and inference. If this is true, gestures should be observed in both think-aloud and 
control situations and both incongruent hand motions and preventing gestures should interfere 
with mental animation. The third possibility is that mental animation depends on premotor 
processes but not on overt gestures, and that overt gestures are used only in verbal expression of 
the results of mental animation processes. If this is true, we should observe gestures when people 
are asked to think aloud, but not in situations in which people do not have to report their thought 
processes, and incongruent motions should interfere with mental animation, but preventing 
gestures should not interfere.  
Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to examine the role of gestures in expressing the results of 
mental animation processes. Participants were asked to think aloud while solving mental 
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animation problems. As in standard protocol instructions, they were asked to say whatever came 
to their mind as they were solving the problems. Although verbal protocol instructions do not 
include instructions to communicate to the experimenter, participants knew they were being 
videotaped and audiotaped, and the experimenter was present, so that they so that they were in a 
communicative situation, at least implicitly. They were shown static diagrams of mechanical 
systems and asked to infer how parts of the systems moved. We examined how they described 
the component motions, both in words and in gestures.   
If the internal representation of how a mechanical component moves is spatial in nature, 
it should be more readily expressed in gestures than in words, whereas if it is verbal in nature, it 
should be more readily expressed in words. There are also ways in which gestures might be used 
in conjunction with speech to express how components move. One possibility is that gestures 
help package thoughts into units that can then be formulated into speech. In this case, gestures 
are used only in the service of speech and should always be accompanied by verbal descriptions 
of the motion of components. Another possibility is that gestures co-occur with speech such that 
they provide precise spatial information not expressed in the language alone, in which case the 
gestures should not be redundant with speech.  
Method 
Participants. Ten undergraduate students from the University of California Santa Barbara 
took part in the experiment as part of a course requirement.  
Materials. The materials consisted of 20 mechanical reasoning problems adapted from 
tests of mechanical reasoning such as the Bennett Mechanical Reasoning test (Bennett, 1969) 
and the mechanical reasoning test of the Differential Aptitudes test (Bennett, et al., 1981). Eight 
of these problems were classified as mental animation problems in that they presented a diagram 
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of a mechanical system with several interacting components, indicated how one component in 
the system was moving and asked participants to infer the motion of another component (see the 
examples in Figure 1). The other 12 problems examined different aspects of mechanical 
reasoning (such as comparisons of forces) that are part of a broader research program and are not 
of interest in the present research. Therefore only the eight mental animation problems will be 
analyzed in the present paper.  
Procedure. Participants were tested individually. First, they were given instructions for 
the mechanical reasoning task, including instructions to think aloud as they solved the problems. 
They were handed a pointer and asked to use this pointer to indicate which component in the 
diagram they were referring to at a given time. The problems were presented one at a time on a 
17-inch computer monitor. Participants were allowed as long as they needed to solve each 
problem. While they solved the problems, a video camera was aimed on the computer screen to 
record any hand motions (gestures) they made, and their verbalizations were recorded by means 
of a microphone.  
Coding.  We transcribed participants’ verbalizations while solving the problems and three 
raters together identified all verb phrases that described the motion of a mechanical component. 
We classified the description of motion in each verb phrase as lexical if the motion was 
described completely in words (e.g. “it turns clockwise), exophoric (cf. Schwartz & Black, 
1996a) if the verbal description referred to a gesture (e.g., “it turns this way”), anaphoric if it 
referred to a previously described motion (e.g., “it turns in the opposite direction”) or as not 
specifying the direction of motion (e.g. “it turns”). Three raters independently coded 25% of the 
trials, All 3 agreed on 94% of the codes and resolved the discrepancies by consensus. The 
remainder of the trials were coded by one of these raters. 
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We then coded each gesture accompanying a verb phrase as tracing if the participant 
moved the pointer or their finger on a component of the diagram to indicate how it would move, 
deictic if the participant pointed to a component, or other if the participant made some hand 
movement that could not be classified as one of these types. Finally we noted when a verb phase 
was not accompanied by a gesture. Three raters independently coded the gestures on 25% of the 
trials and agreed on 85% of cases, and again discrepancies were resolved by consensus. The 
remainder of the trials were coded by one of these raters rater. 
Results and Discussion 
 Participants solved on average 5.9 of the eight problems correctly (SD = 1.6). Across the 
eight problems, participants described the motion of a mechanical component an average of 28.3 
times (SD = 17.8). Table 1 presents data on how the motion was described in each case and the 
types of gestures that accompanied the verbal description. The majority (59%) of verb phrases 
describing motion (M = 16.7, SD = 11.14) were classified as exophoric, such that the verbal 
description (e.g. “this way”) depended on a simultaneous gesture whereas an additional 13% (M 
=3.7, SD = 4.7) of verb phrases did not include an adverbial phrase specifying motion direction 
of motion. Almost all of these cases were accompanied by a tracing gesture that demonstrated 
the direction of motion. In the remainder of cases, the direction of motion was described either 
lexically or using an anaphor. These verb phrases were also typically accompanied by tracing 
gestures. In fact, 98.6% of verb phrases were accompanied by a gesture, so that gestures 
accompanied almost all verb phrases regardless of whether the words expressed how the 
component moved. Finally, 92.5% of all gestures were tracing gestures in which the participant 
traced the direction of motion on a component of the static diagram1.  
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To illustrate these points, Table 2 presents the transcripts of two participants solving a 
gear problem that showed 4 interlocking gears (the problem was similar to the one shown in 
Figure 1 but cannot be reproduced here for copyright reasons). It is clear that gesture was central 
to Participant A’s description of how the mechanical components moved, as it is not possible to 
tell what he was thinking from the verbal information alone. In contrast, Participant B described 
the motion of components lexically. Note that although this participant’s speech fully expressed 
the direction of motion of the components, it was also accompanied by tracing gestures.  
It is clear from this and the pilot experiment that gesture is important in expressing how 
components of mechanical systems move, that is, in externalizing the results of internal mental 
animation processes. In both of these experiments, participants were required to think aloud, and 
tracing gestures were pervasive in their “think aloud” protocols.  In a minority of cases gestures 
were accompanied by speech expressing the same information as the gesture, so it is possible 
that these gestures were produced in the service of speech production. However, in most cases, 
the information given in the gesture was not expressed verbally. One possibility is that these 
gestures expressed precise spatial information that is difficult to translate to a verbal form, i.e. 
that their function is to communicate to the observer. But another possibility is that these 
gestures are functional in thinking itself, that is, they facilitate the inference process. We 
investigated this possibility in two further experiments. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we examined the effects of think aloud instructions and a spatial 
secondary task on mental animation performance. There were three groups in this experiment, a 
control group, a verbal protocol group who were instructed to think aloud, and a dual task group, 
who were required to tap a spatial pattern while they solved the problems.  
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We predicted that the think aloud group would gesture while solving most problems, as 
in Experiment 1. If gestures are used for verbal expression purposes alone, then we should 
observe gesturing only in the verbal protocol group. On the other hand if gestures are functional 
in both inference and verbal expression, we should observe gesturing in both the verbal protocol 
and control groups. 
We predicted that spatial tapping would impair performance on the mental animation 
problems. There are several levels at which this task might interfere with performance. First, 
spatial tapping prevents participants from gesturing, so that if gestures are functional in the 
inference process, interference might occur at this level.  Second spatial tapping requires the 
production of hand motions that are incongruent with the motions to be inferred, so that the 
interference might occur at the level of premotor representations, if these are involved in 
inferring motion. Third, in studies of working memory, spatial tapping is often used as a 
secondary task that depends on spatial working memory resources (Baddeley, 1986) and 
previous research has suggested that mental animation is also dependent on spatial working 
memory (Sims & Hegarty, 1997), so that spatial tapping should impair mental animation 
performance.  
Method 
Participants and design.  Forty-five undergraduate students from the University of 
California, Santa Barbara took part in the experiment in return for course credit. Fifteen 
participants served in the verbal protocol group, fifteen in the spatial tapping group, and fifteen 
in the control group.  
Materials and Apparatus.  The materials consisted of a Mental Animation scale, 
consisting of 20 mechanical reasoning problems and a spatial tapping sheet. The mechanical 
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problems included the eight problems analyzed in Experiment 1 along with an additional 12 
mental animation problems. They were presented one at a time on a 17 inch computer monitor 
using a Gateway computer running Superlab software. The internal consistency of the mental 
animation scale (consisting of the 20 problems), as measured by Chronbach’s Alpha, was .71.  
For the spatial tapping group, we used a piece of paper, divided into 4 squares, with each 
square labeled with the numbers 1, 2, 3 or 4 (see Figure 2). Participants were asked to tap these 
squares throughout each problem, according to the numerical sequence. A metronome was used 
to give them a time signal for their tapping responses.  
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition and were 
tested individually. First, they were then given instructions for the mechanical reasoning task, 
and were given three sample problems to view and answer.  If they answered any of the sample 
problems incorrectly, they were corrected and the experimenter explained how to solve the 
problem. A final set of instructions was then read to them, asking them to verbally state the 
answer (either A, B or C) aloud for each problem. At this point, participants in the control group 
began the 20 mechanical reasoning trials. Each participant viewed the problems in the same 
order. 
Participants in the verbal protocol group were given the same initial instructions as the 
control group.  Then they were given additional instructions to think aloud as they completed the 
task. They were handed a pencil and told that they could use it to point to the part of the diagram 
that they were thinking about, but were not instructed to gesture. After these additional 
instructions, they began the 20 mechanical reasoning problems.  
Participants in the spatial tapping group were given the same initial instructions as the 
control group.  Then they were instructed to tap the squares on the piece of paper in the order “1, 
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2, 3, 4” to the tick of a metronome.  The metronome ticked at a rate of 108 ticks per minute.  
They practiced spatial tapping alone for 1 minute. Upon conclusion of the practice session, they 
were given final instructions for the mechanical reasoning task, which involved solving the 
mechanical problems and spatial tapping at the same time. Participants were instructed to 
commence spatial tapping immediately prior to the presentation of each problem, and to continue 
tapping throughout, until they had announced the solution. They were allowed to rest between 
problems.   
In all conditions of the experiment, the experimenter pressed a response key when the 
participant announced his or her response to the problem, and this was used as an approximate 
measure of solution time. Then a blank screen appeared and the participant informed the 
experimenter when to press a key to advance to the next problem. Participants were allowed up 
to 30 seconds to solve each problem. The experimenter recorded their answers (A, B or C) on a 
scoring sheet. She also observed the participants while they were solving the mechanical 
reasoning problems and noted whether they made one or more gestures on each problem. 
Results and Discussion. 
 
Use of Gestures.  We predicted that participants in the think-aloud condition would 
gesture on most problems. If gestures function only in the communication process, we should 
observe gestures only in this condition, and not in the control condition. There was a large 
significant difference in gesturing between the groups, F(2,42) = 55.07, MSE = 23.36, p<.001, 
partial η2= .72. Post-hoc (Scheffe) comparisons (Alpha = .05) indicated that the verbal protocol 
group gestured significantly more than the control and spatial tapping groups, and the difference 
between the control and spatial tapping group was marginally significant (p = .05)2.  
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As predicted, participants in the verbal protocol group gestured on nearly all of the 20 
problems (M = 18.53, SD = 1.51). Participants in the control condition also gestured on some 
problems (M = 5.20, SD = 8.06). There was no strong evidence that particular problems were 
more or less likely to evoke gestures (the rate of gestures by control participants ranged from .13 
to .40 for the different problems). However, there were large individual differences in gesturing 
among the control group, with 4 of the 15 participants in this group gesturing on 17 or more of 
the 20 problems, and the other 11 of the 15 participants gesturing on 3 or fewer problems. Rate 
of gesturing was not significantly correlated with performance on the mental animation problems 
for either the verbal protocol group (r = .01) or the control group (r = -.20). The spatial tapping 
condition was largely successful in preventing participants from gesturing, such that participants 
in this group gestured on less than one of the 20 problems on average (0.73, SD = 1.67) – these 
participants occasionally attempted to gesture with their left hand while tapping with the right 
hand.  
The result that participants in the verbal protocol group gestured more than control 
participants suggests that gestures function primarily in expressing the results of mental 
animation processes process. However, the result that some participants in the control group also 
gestured, suggests that verbal expression may not be the only function of gestures in solving 
these types of problems, i.e., gestures may be important in the inference process also, at least for 
some individuals.  
Mechanical Reasoning Performance. If gestures function in only in expressing or 
communicating the results of mental animation processes, spatial tapping, which prevents 
gesturing, should not have an effect on mechanical reasoning. On the other hand, if they function 
in the inference process, spatial tapping should impair performance because the action of tapping 
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precludes simultaneous gesturing. As shown in Figure 3, the spatial tapping group had poorer 
performance on the mechanical reasoning problems than the other two groups. Problem accuracy 
was significantly affected by experimental condition, F(2,42) = 5.21, MSE = 10.63, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .20. Post-hoc (Scheffe) comparisons with Alpha level set at .05 indicated that the 
control group was significantly more accurate than the spatial tapping group, but the difference 
between the control group and the verbal protocol group was not statistically significant, nor was 
the difference between the verbal protocol group and the spatial tapping group. The experimental 
groups also differed in response times, shown in Table 3, F(2,42) = 55.07, MSE = 23.36, p<.001, 
partial η2= .22.  Post hoc (Scheffe) comparisons with an alpha level of .05 indicated that the 
control group had a significantly lower response times than both the spatial tapping and verbal 
protocol groups, which did not differ significantly from each other. 
The seemingly poorer performance of the verbal protocol group, relative to the control 
group, might have been an experimental artifact, due to the fact that participants were given a 
time limit for each problem, and it took additional time for participants in the verbal protocol 
group to explain their answers. Participants in the verbal protocol group were somewhat more 
likely to time out while solving a problem (on 3.7 problems on average) than the control group 
(who timed out on 2.2 problems on average). Both the accuracy and reaction time measures 
indicated that spatial tapping significantly impaired mental animation performance. One possible 
explanation of this result is that spatial tapping prevented participants from gesturing, which is 
functional in the inference process. However, the spatial tapping task did more than merely 
prevent gesturing. It also engaged premotor and spatial representations. If either or both of these 
functions are required by the mental animation task, it could account for the interference that we 
observed. We conducted a third experiment to disambiguate these possibilities. 
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Experiment 3 
There are three possible explanations of interference of spatial tapping with mental 
animation in Experiment 3. First spatial tapping precludes overt gesturing, second, it engages 
premotor and motor processes and third, it depends on spatial working memory. Thus, the 
interference that we observed might have occurred at any, or all of these levels. To disambiguate 
these possibilities, in Experiment 3, we contrasted the effects of spatial tapping with two other 
conditions. First, we examined the effects of simple tapping, a simpler secondary task that 
involved tapping a single key to the beat of a metronome. This task engaged premotor and motor 
processes, and prevented gestures, but made minimal demand on spatial processing resources. 
Second, we examined the effects of restricting participants’ hand movements while solving the 
mechanical reasoning problems. This task prevented gesturing, but did not engage either the 
motor system or spatial processing functions. If overt gestures are functional in the inference 
process, all three of these experimental conditions should impair mental animation performance. 
If premotor representations and processes are involved in mental animation, mental animation 
should be impaired by spatial tapping and simple tapping but not by hand restriction. If mental 
animation involves spatial working memory resources but does not depend on the motor system, 
spatial tapping should impair performance but simple tapping and hand restriction should not.  
In this experiment we also corrected for some limitations of Experiment 2. First we 
measured not just mental animation performance, but also performance on the secondary tasks 
(spatial tapping and simple tapping) to ensure participants were actually carrying out the 
secondary task properly. Second, we measured reaction time more precisely, by requiring 
participants to press a key when announcing their answer to the problem 
Method 
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Participants and design.  Sixty right-handed undergraduate students from the University 
of California, Santa Barbara took part in the experiment, in return for course credit. Fifteen 
participants served in the control group, fifteen in the spatial tapping group, fifteen in the simple 
tapping group and fifteen in the hands-restricted group.  
Materials and Apparatus.  The materials included the same 20 mechanical reasoning 
problems as used in Experiment 2. The problems were presented on a 17 inch computer monitor. 
Responses were recorded by means of a Cedrus RB 834 button box, with 4 large buttons in the 
center and four smaller buttons on the side (see Figure 4). As in Experiment 2, a metronome was 
used to give participants a time signal for their tapping responses.  
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition and tested 
individually. First, they were then given instructions for the mechanical reasoning task and 
solved three sample problems, printed on paper, as in Experiment 2. Then they were given 
additional instructions that during the experimental trials, they should press the “response” key 
on the button box with their left index finger as they verbally stated their answer (A. B or C) for 
each problem. They were given two more sample problems to view and answer on the computer, 
in order to practice pressing the “response” key while answering verbally. 
Then participants in the control group and hands restricted group completed the 20 
experimental trials. While completing the trials, participants in the hands-restricted condition 
were instructed to hold the button box with their two hands, so that their left index finger was 
positioned above the response box. Their hands were held in position by elastic bands, thus 
restricting any movements.   
Participants in the spatial tapping group were given the same instructions as in 
Experiment 1 and practiced spatial tapping for 30 seconds to the tick of a metronome, before 
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commencing the twenty experimental trials. They tapped the spatial pattern with their right hand 
and tapped the response key with their left hand to indicate when they made their response. 
Participants in the simple tapping group were instructed to tap a single button (the top left large 
button) with their right index finger to the beat of a metronome during the experimental trials. 
They practiced this tapping response for 30 seconds alone before commencing the experimental 
trials. For both tapping tasks, the metronome ticked at a rate of 108 ticks per minute. 
Results and Discussion.  
Gestures. Three of the 15 participants in the simple tapping condition gestured during one 
or two of the 20 problems and no hand gestures were observed in either the hands restricted or 
spatial tapping conditions, indicating that the experimental manipulations were successful in 
preventing hand gestures. On average, participants in the control group gestured on 4.33 of the 
20 problems (SD = 6.38). Although the amount of gesturing was somewhat lower in this 
experiment, there were again large individual differences, such that four of the 15 participants in 
this condition gestured on 10 or more of the problems, whereas ten of the participants gestured 
on fewer than 3 problems. As in Experiment 2, this difference in rate of gesturing was not 
significantly related to performance on the mental animation problems (r = .20, p = .47).  
Mechanical Reasoning Performance. If gestures are functional in inferring motion from 
static diagrams, then performance of the spatial tapping, simple tapping and hands restricted 
conditions should all be impaired relative to the control group. If the effects of spatial tapping 
observed in Experiment 1 were due to interference at the level of premotor representations, 
spatial tapping and simple tapping, but not hand restriction, should impair performance. Finally, 
if the interference is at the level of spatial working memory resources, only spatial tapping 
should impair performance 
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As Figure 5 shows, there was a significant difference between the groups, F(3, 56) = 
5.152, MSe = .3728, p = .003. Post-hoc (Sheffe) comparisons with an alpha level of .05 indicated 
that the hands restricted (M = 13.87, SD = 3.09) and control groups (M = 13.67, SD = 2.5), had 
superior performance to the spatial tapping group (M = 10.4, SD = 2.38). The performance of the 
simple tapping group did not differ significantly from any of the other groups. This experiment 
replicated the impairment effect of spatial tapping that was observed in Experiment 2. The lack 
of an effect of hand restriction and the non-significant effect of simple tapping are more 
consistent with the spatial working memory hypothesis than with the idea that gestures or motor 
representations are functional in the process of inferring motion from static diagrams. Note that 
these non effects cannot be interpreted as ceiling effects, as participants were far from ceiling (20 
problems correct) on this task. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of response 
times for the four groups There were no significant effects of experimental condition on reaction 
times in this experiment, F(3, 56) =. 562, MSE = 12.28, p = .643. 
Secondary Task Performance. In dual-task experiments, it is important to examine both 
primary and secondary task performance, to ensure that non-effects of the secondary task on 
primary task performance were not due to the fact that participants were simply not carrying out 
the secondary task. To examine the effects of the mental animation task on the secondary tasks 
of spatial and simple tapping, we compared tapping performance during the initial practice 
period (single task condition), in which participants performed the tapping task alone for 30 
seconds, to their performance when tapping was paired with mental animation (dual task 
condition). Participants in the spatial tapping single task condition never tapped a key out of 
order, whereas 3.4% of spatial taps (SD = 3.0) in the dual task condition were out of order, and 
this rate was significantly different from zero, t(14) = 4.48, p = .001. Participants in the simple 
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tapping condition never tapped the wrong key in either the single task or dual task conditions. 
Thus spatial tapping performance was impaired by mental animation, suggesting that these tasks 
shared resources. In contrast, simple tapping was not impaired, so that the non-significant effect 
of simple tapping on the primary task cannot be attributed to the idea that participants were not 
carrying out the simple tapping task correctly. 
Since participants were required to tap to the tick of a metronome, variability in rate of 
tapping is also an indication of impaired performance on the secondary tasks. We also measured 
participants’ rate of tapping (i.e., mean time between taps) and how regularly they tapped, 
(assessed by computing the standard deviation of times between taps). The metronome sounded 
at a rate of 108 ticks per second, so perfect performance on the tapping measures would be a 
tapping rate of 555 milliseconds and a standard deviation of 0. Table 4 presents data on rate of 
tapping and regularity of tapping in the single and dual task conditions. Although there were 
trends for participants to tap less frequently and less regularly in the dual-task conditions, these 
differences were not significant. 
General Discussion 
In this series of experiments we have examined gesture production during mental 
animation of static mechanical diagrams in order to better understand how gestures co-occur 
with linguistic descriptions of mechanical movement as well as how gestures may be produced to 
help in facilitating the inference of motion from static diagrams. It is clear from Experiments 1 
and 2 that gestures serve an important function in expressing how machine components move. In 
both experiments, people who were asked to think aloud, gestured on almost all of the problems. 
In Experiment 1, most gestures expressed information that was not stated in words. In 
Experiment 2, people who were asked to think aloud gestured much more than those in a control 
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group. It appears therefore that when people have to communicate how parts of a machine move, 
gestures are naturally evoked. A likely explanation of these results is that the internal 
representations in mental animation tasks are spatial in nature, and that these representations can 
be expressed more easily and more completely in gesture, because the hands can be used to 
mimic the manner of motion (Emmorey & Casey, 2001). Another possibility is that the gestures 
are used in the service of verbal communication, such that they help package the information in 
units for speaking (cf. Kita, 2000). However, in the think aloud conditions, most gestures did not 
lead to a verbal description of motion (i.e., motion was expressed in gestures alone) and some 
participants gestured in control conditions were they were not required to speak. Therefore, this 
cannot have been the only function of gestures in this study.  
It is possible that aspects of our experimental procedures influenced the rate of gesturing 
in this study. First, in all of the “think aloud” conditions, participants were given a pencil and 
asked to point to components as they referred to them in their verbal protocol. This pointer was 
introduced so that participants would not have to find names for the different mechanical 
components, but it might have caused them to make more gestures than they would have made 
naturally. However it is important to note that participants were instructed to use this pointer for 
deictic purposes only, and the vast majority of their gestures (tracing gestures) were imitative 
and not purely deictic. Nevertheless, it is important to replicate these studies in a situation were 
people are not given a pointer or explicitly instructed to point to components. Another factor that 
influences gesture production is the presence of another individual who can see the gestures. In 
the present study, an experimenter was present in all conditions, so differential amounts of 
gesturing across the experimental conditions can not be attributed to presence of another. 
However, to fully investigate the functions of gestures in thinking as opposed to communication, 
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it is also important to repeat these experiments in a situation where an experimenter is not 
present. Finally, it will be important in future studies to directly compare the types of gestures 
that accompany speech to those used in control conditions where participant are not asked to 
think aloud. 
With respect to the function of gestures in thinking, the results of these studies provide no 
direct evidence that overt gestures are functional in thinking. Although some people gestured 
while solving the problems, even in control conditions in which they were not required to 
communicate, preventing gestures by restricting people’s hand movements or by simple tapping 
did not significantly impair performance. Also, there was no evidence that individual differences 
in gesturing were related to problem solving performance. On the other hand, in both 
Experiments 2 and 3, concurrent spatial tapping did impair performance. In addition to 
preventing gesture and engaging the motor system, spatial tapping has been found to rely on 
spatial working memory (Logie, 1995; Smyth, Pearson & Pendleton, 1988; Smyth & Pendleton, 
1989). The selective effects of spatial tapping on performance therefore suggest that mental 
animation relies strongly on spatial working memory resources, a result that is consistent with 
previous research (Sims & Hegarty, 1987).  
Our results suggest that mental animation is a process that both depends on spatial 
working memory resources and is naturally expressed in gestures. This prompts us to ask if there 
is a specific relation between spatial working memory representations and gesture. In support of 
this view, gestures are associated not just with the solution of spatial problems, but there is 
considerable evidence in the language production literature that gestures are particularly 
associated with the communication of spatial information more generally (Alibali, Heath & 
Myers, 2001; Kita & Oezyurek, 2003; Rauscher, Krauss & Chen, 1996). One reason why spatial 
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content may be naturally expressed in gesture, is that the spatial working memory system may in 
fact be highly related to the premotor and motor systems. Logie (1995) argues that similar 
neuroanatomical structures and pathways underlie spatial and motor representations, concluding 
that “the retention of spatial information, the retention of movements, and the production of 
movements all rel[y] on overlapping cognitive resources” (p. 116). This conclusion, which is 
related to theories of embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002), is supported by evidence that 
concurrent spatial movements impair performance on a range of spatial and imagery tasks 
(Farmer, Berman & Fletcher, 1986; Quinn & Ralston, 1985, Smyth, Pearson & Pendleton, 1988). 
It is also consistent with the results of neuroimaging studies, showing premotor activation in 
spatial imagery tasks (Wraga et al., in press).  
Although we found no evidence in this study that gestures are functional in thinking, it 
would be premature to conclude this on the basis of this study alone. We found striking 
individual differences in the spontaneous use of gestures among participants in control 
conditions, with a minority of students gesturing on most of the problems, even when not asked 
to think aloud. Furthermore, a small number of participants attempted to gesture, even in the 
spatial tapping and simple tapping conditions, and we also observed that in the hands-restricted 
condition, some participants gestured with their heads, behavior that was also reported by St. 
John (1992). Thus it is possible that gestures are more functional in thought for some individuals 
than others.  
It is important to investigate individual differences in gesture in future studies. These 
studies could assess the degree of impairment by secondary tasks on an individual level, using a 
within-subjects design in which participants perform mental animation in both dual-task and 
control conditions. For example, in the present study, there was a non-significant trend for 
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simple tapping to impair performance, raising the question of whether simple tapping impaired 
performance for some participants but not others, and a significant effect would be observed with 
a more powerful experimental design. It would also be illuminating to investigate whether the 
use of gestures is correlated with other individual differences measures, such as expertise, spatial 
ability and cognitive style. 
In summary, we considered three possible accounts of the role of gestures and motor 
processes in mental animation performance. The first account is that gestures are functional only 
in expressing the results of mental animation and there is no involvement of the motor system in 
mental animation. The second is that overt gestures are functional in both the mental animation 
process and expression. The third is that overt gestures are functional only in expression, but that 
mental animation depends on premotor representations and spatial working memory resources 
that are involved in planning movements. The results presented in this paper are most consistent 
with the third account. However they have revealed important individual differences in the use of 
gesture in both communication and inference, suggesting that one possible account of the 
function of gestures in mental animation and other problem solving situations may not fit all 
individuals. As we continue to investigate the role of gestures in spatial cognition, it is important 
that we take account of individual differences and not assume that one model will necessarily 
account for the performance of all individuals.  
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Footnote 
1As indicated by the standard deviations in Table 1, there were large individual differences in 
frequency of gestures. Accuracy was correlated .53 (p = .11) with frequency of tracing gestures 
and .33 (= .36) with frequency of deictic gestures. It would be premature to interpret these trends 
given their lack of statistical significance and the small number of participants, but they might 
have merely reflected more verbalizations and gestures by participants who were more confident 
in their answers. 
2 We did not record the gestures in Experiments 2 and 3 so cannot formally compare the types of 
gestures used in the verbal protocol and control conditions. However, the experimenter could 
detect no differences between the types of gestures used in these two conditions, and reported 
that as in Experiment 1 they were primarily tracing gestures. 
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Table 1  
 
Mean number of gestures of different types used by participants in conjunction with verb phrases 
describing the motion of mechanical components across the 8 experimental trials. The verb 
phrases are classified by how they expressed the manner of motion of a component. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
            ______ 
 
   Type of Gesture 
 
                  Tracing     Deictic      Other            None  
            ______ 
 
Type of Verbal Description   
 
Lexical (e.g. “clockwise”)       5.2   (6.5)        0.4 (0.7)   0.1 (0.3)    0.1 (0.3) 
 
Exophoric (e.g., “this way”)  16.1 (10.4)   0.4 (0.7)   0.2 (0.4)    0.0 (0.0)     
 
Anaphoric (e.g., “opposite”)     1.5   (2.0)   0.5 (1.0)   0.1 (0.3)    0.0 (0.0) 
 
No Adverb (e.g., “it’s turning”)            3.0   (3.6)        0.3 (0.7)   0.1 (0.3)    0.3 (0.7) 
 
Total      25.8 (15.7)   1.6 (2.0)   0.5 (1.7)    0.4 (0.7) 
            ______ 
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Table 2 
 
Verbal protocols (with simultaneous gestures in parentheses) of two  participants solving a 
problem that showed four interlocking gears. An arrow indicated that the leftmost gear was 
turning counterclockwise, and the participant had to choose whether the rightmost gear would 
turn counterclockwise (direction A) or clockwise (direction B). We refer to the gears as Gear 1, 
2, 3 and 4 from left to right.  Participant A uses primarily exophoric expressions whereas 
Participant B describes the motions lexically. 
 
Participant A  
S (Reading Question): When the left-hand gear moves in the direction shown,  
which way will the right one, right-hand gear turn? (no gestures) 
(Solving): So it’s going this way, (tracing pointer counterclockwise on Gear 1) 
which means this one moves this way, (tracing pointer clockwise on Gear 2) 
this one moves this way (tracing pointer counterclockwise on Gear 3) 
this one moves this way (tracing pointer clockwise on Gear 4) 
Participant B 
S (Reading Question): When the left, O.K. when the left-hand gear moves in the direction 
shown, which way will the right one, right-hand gear turn? (no gestures) 
(Solving): Um, O.K. 
so this is turning counterclockwise (tracing pencil counterclockwise on Gear 1) 
so this would be turning clockwise (tracing pencil clockwise on Gear 2) 
so this be counterclockwise (tracing pencil clockwise on Gear 3) 
so this would be clockwise (tracing pencil clockwise on Gear 4) 
so it’s B
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Table 3  
 
Mean Response Time and Standard Deviation per problem by Condition in Experiments 2 and 3. 
             
 
Response Time (in sec) 
 
   Group    Mean  Standard Deviation 
             
 
Experiment 2  Control   17.94   4.15 
 
Verbal Protocol  21.42   3.09 
 
Spatial Tapping  21.58   2.48 
 
Experiment 3  Control   17.32   3.71 
 
Spatial Tapping  18.69   3.42 
 
Simple Tapping  18.25   4.02 
 
Hands Restricted  17.35   2.73 
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Table 4 
Mean rate of tapping and regularity of tapping (measured in seconds) in single task and dual 
task conditions of Experiment 3 for participants in the spatial tapping and simple tapping 
conditions (standard deviation in parentheses).  
     Tapping Rate   Tapping Regularity 
     (Mean time    (Standard deviation 
     between taps)   of time between taps) 
Spatial tapping alone   0.587 (.044)      .098 (.082) 
Spatial tapping (dual task)  0.618 (.077)      .142 (.132) 
Simple tapping alone   0.597 (.039)      .064 (.037) 
Simple tapping (dual task)  0.594 (.036)      .079 (.037) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Sample mental animation problem 
Figure 2. Diagrams printed on paper that participants tapped in the spatial tapping condition of 
Experiment 2. Participants tapped the numbers in order. 
Figure 3. Mean accuracy in the different experimental conditions of Experiment 2. Error bars 
show standard error of the mean. 
Figure 4. Diagram of the button box used in Experiment 3. Participants in the spatial tapping 
condition tapped the number keys in order. Participants in the simple tapping condition tapped 
the key marked “1” repeatedly. 
Figure 5. Mean accuracy in the different experimental conditions of Experiment 3. Error bars 
show standard error of the mean. 
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